The Judge Struck Down FIFO For Want Of A Notification. That Was The Wrong Ground.
The State issues inter-State transport permits first-come, first-served. A Single Judge quashed the resolution behind it. A Division Bench has sent the real question back.
The Court held that neither ground relied on by the Single Judge — absence of a notification, and statutory infraction — was justified. It found no rule-making power or notification requirement in the Act relating to the grant of inter-State permits, so the State was not unjustified in adopting FIFO. But the separate challenge that the method is vitiated by a lack of transparency is arguable, and the matter was remanded to be heard on that limited question.
- Section 67 is about fares, crowding and safety, not about issuing permits to fresh applicants.
- Section 212 governs how rules are published, not the power to make them.
- No notification requirement means no infraction — the first ground simply did not exist.
- Transparency is a live question, and the Court deliberately left it to the writ court rather than deciding it itself.
- Court
- High Court at Calcutta
- Citation
- MAT No. 2123 of 2025
- Case
- MAT No. 2123 of 2025
- Decided
- September 2026
- Outcome
- Appeal partly allowed; order set aside and writ petition remanded on the limited question
What the provisions actually cover
The notification required under Section 67(1) pertains to passengers' convenience, economically competitive fares, prevention of overcrowding and road safety. Its clauses concern advantages to the public, trade and industry, the development of motor transport, coordinating road and rail transport, preventing deterioration of the road system and promoting competition among existing service providers. None relates directly to issuing stage carriage permits to fresh applicants.
Section 67(3) concerns schemes for transporting goods and passengers and licences under such schemes, which the parties themselves accepted do not directly relate to stage carriage permits at inter-State or State level.
Section 212 speaks to previous publication, publication in the Official Gazette and laying rules before the Legislature — the modalities of rules already framed, not the parent power to make them. Section 210D concerns road design and maintenance standards.
The conclusion on the two grounds
On a perusal of the Act, the Court found no rule-making power, and no power to issue directions or notifications, vested in the State specifically in relation to the grant of inter-State transport permits, and no consequential statutory requirement to publish such directions in the Official Gazette.
In the absence of any statutory requirement, it could not be said that the State was entirely unjustified in adopting the FIFO principle merely because there was no notification. Neither of the Single Judge's two grounds was justified.
What still has to be decided
The writ petitioner had also raised the question of the resolution and the FIFO modality being vitiated by a lack of transparency. That question is arguable and had to be decided on the merits by the writ court, and was not considered.
The Court relegated the matter for a comprehensive consideration of the statutory and constitutional validity of the FIFO method and, consequentially, of the resolution of 12 December 2024. It deliberately declined to decide those questions itself, which would have deprived the parties of a forum of challenge.
The appeal was partly allowed, the judgment set aside and the writ petition remanded to be heard afresh on that limited question.
Who argued it
Appearances as recorded in the judgment of the Court.
Frequently asked
Does a permit allotment method have to be notified in the Gazette?
Not for inter-State transport permits. The Court found no statutory requirement to publish such directions.
Is FIFO therefore valid?
That is undecided. The transparency challenge was held arguable and sent back to the writ court.
Challenging how a State allots permits
- Find the actual source of the power before arguing that a notification was required; often none exists.
- Separate the publication provisions from the rule-making ones — they answer different objections.
- Plead transparency and arbitrariness as an independent ground; that is the one that survived here.
- Expect a remand rather than a decision where the writ court never reached the point.
Source. High Court at Calcutta, MAT No. 2123 of 2025, decided September 2026 by . This explainer is written from the judgment text as reported.
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